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There is No Such Thing as a Harmless Constitutional 
Error: Returning to a Rule of Automatic Reversal 
James Edward Wicht !If 
I. INTRODUCTION 
"That which is unjust can really profit no one; that which is just can 
really harm no one."1 
The federal harmless error doctrine was enacted by Congress in 1919 
to combat a serious problem plaguing the criminal justice system. 2 At the 
time, criminal convictions were reversed on appeal for such minor errors 
as the omission of the word "the" from the charging indictment. In fact, 
any technical defect resulted in reversal. Compounding this problem were 
defense attorneys who, knowing it would result in retrial, sometimes de-
liberately placed technical errors into the record or consciously allowed 
such errors to occur. While such reversals would put a strain on our mod-
ern judicial system, the burden was particularly acute given the logistics 
of the early 1900's, especially with regard to communication and trans-
portation. 
Congress responded to the problem by articulating what has come to 
be known as the harmless error rule. To be classified as harmless under 
the original rule, the error must not have affected the substantial rights of 
the parties. 3 By doing so, the harmless error rule prevented the setting 
aside of convictions for small errors which were unlikely to have influ-
enced the outcome of the trial. The rule was broadly written and applied 
to a wide variety of situations. While the almost infinite number of tech-
nical errors prevented the drafting of specific rules to cover every con-
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1. AMERICAN QUafATIONS 306 (Gorton Carruth & Eugene Ehrlich eds., Wings Books 
1992) (quoting Henry George, THE IRISH LAND QUESTION (1884)). 
2. Act of February 26, 1919, ch. 48, 40 Stat. 1181, JuDICIAL CODE § 269, 28 U.S.C. §391 
(1919) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 2111 (1996)). 
3. !d. 
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ceivable situation, the general wording of the rule left open the question 
of just how broadly it was to be applied. 4 
Prior to 1967, courts held Constitutional errors could never be harm-
less. In cases where a defendant's federal Constitutional rights were vio-
lated, the reviewing courts reversed the convictions and remanded the 
cases for new trials free of Constitutional infrrmity. 5 Despite these early 
cases,in Chapman v. Califomia6 the United States Supreme Court treated 
the issue of whether a Constitutional error could be subjected to harmless 
error analysis as a question of first impression. The Court answered the 
question by holding that under some circumstances the violation of a de-
fendant's Constitutional rights could qualify as harmless error.7 
After Chapman, the next and obvious question was which rights were 
subject to harmless error analysis. Initially, the Court addressed the issue 
on a case-by-case basis, often without articulating a rationale as to why a 
given error was subject to harmless error analysis. Finally, in 1991 the 
Court attempted to provide a general rule for guiding the determination of 
whether a particular Constitutional violation was subject to harmless er-
ror review. According to Chief Justice Rhenquist writing for the majority 
in Arizona v. Fulminante, 8 the type of right that was violated determines 
whether the harmless error rule applies. Constitutional errors character-
ized as trial errors are subject to harmless error analysis, whereas struc-
tural errors are not. 9 
While the original harmless error rule provided a necessary remedy to 
a legitimate jurisprudential problem, the rule has evolved well beyond 
merely addressing the small technical defects for which it was originally 
intended. So much so that under current Supreme Court case law, even 
the wrongful admission of a coerced confession may be deemed a harm-
less error. 10 This explosion of the harmless error doctrine goes beyond the 
original purpose of the rule and has taken Constitutional law as applied to 
criminal defendants down a road better left untraveled. 
Part II examines the history of harmless error jurisprudence from the 
advent of the rule through the Supreme Court's articulation of the trial 
versus structural error distinction. Part III discusses the commonality 
shared by all Constitutional rights and demonstrates that they cannot be 
4. Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 760 (1946). 
5. E.g., Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958) (coerced confession); Gideon v. 
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to counsel); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927) 
(impartial judge). 
6. 386 u.s. 18 (1967). 
7. /d. at 22. 
8. 499 u.s. 279 (1991). 
9. !d. at 306-10. 
10. /d. 
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divided into the currently employed trial versus structural error frame-
work Next, Part IV examines the inherent difficulties of applying harm-
less error analysis to Constitutional errors. It frrst shows how the Su-
preme Court deviated from established precedent in holding that Consti-
tutional errors could be subjected to harmless error analysis. It then ex-
plores the impossibility of a reviewing court being able to effectively 
weigh the impact a Constitutional error has on the trier of fact. Part IV 
also discusses what may be the greatest problem caused by the applica-
tion of harmless error analysis to Constitutional rights: the lowering of 
the inherent value attached to those rights. 
Part V evaluates the merits of returning to a rule of automatic rever-
sal. The beneficial effects of such a policy on the courts, prosecutors, de-
fendants and the general public present compelling reasons for a renewed 
adherence to the automatic reversal rule. While criminal defendants may 
not be entitled to perfect trials, they do deserve proceedings free from 
Constitutional infirmity. 
II. THE HISTORY OF THE HARMLESS ERROR RULE 
In 1906, the state of Missouri tried and convicted Bruce Campbell for 
raping a young girl named Willie Clark 11 During the trial, the prosecu-
tion presented detailed and convincing evidence of Mr. Campen's guilt, 
including compelling testimony from the victim, Ms. Clark 12 Ms. Clark 
explained that she came to stay with Mr. Campbell and his wife while 
traveling to visit her father and brother. 13 She described precisely how 
Mr. Campbell returned to the house one morning when his wife was gone 
and raped her. 14 As further evidence of the defendant's guilt, Ms. Clark 
told the jury about Mr. Campbell's attempt to conceal his crime by offer-
ing her money in exchange for not reporting his vicious violation of her.15 
In addition to the victim's testimony, the jury also heard the testi-
mony of a neighbor who had seen Ms. Clark shortly after the attack. 16 
Although not an eyewitness to the actual rape, the neighbor observed Ms. 
Clark crying, "bareheaded and disheveled" shortly after the alleged rape 
occurred.17 A physician who examined Ms. Clark shortly after the attack 
provided further support for the state's case by informing the jury that her 
11. State v. Campell, I 09 S. W. 706, 707 (Mo. 1908). 
12. See Id. at 707-08. 
13. ld. at 707. Her father and brother lived in Joplin, Missouri. 
14. ld. 
15. ld. at 708. 
16. ld. at 707-08. 
17. ld. 
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medical condition was consistent with someone who had been raped. 18 
Perhaps even more damning, a law enforcement officer testified that on 
the day the defendant posted bond, the defendant admitted to him, "I have 
a notion to plead guilty."19 Based upon this evidence,20 the jury found Mr. 
Campbell guilty of raping Ms. Clark.21 
Despite this seemingly accurate verdict, the appellate court reversed 
Mr. Campbell's conviction.22 The reversal occurred not because Mr. 
Campbell's federal Constitutional rights had been violated, not because 
the state failed to proffer evidence on one of the elements of rape23and 
not because the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction. 24 In-
stead, the appellate court reversed Mr. Campbell's conviction merely be-
cause the language at the end of the charging indictment alleged that the 
rape occurred "against the peace and dignity of state" rather than there-
quired "against the peace and dignity of the state."25 
Prior to the advent of the harmless error rule, results such as the one 
just described occurred all too often. 26 Because a conviction had to be 
achieved in an error-free trial, the threat of convictions being reversed on 
such minor technicalities was great.27 Regrettably, the error-free convic-
tion requirement reduced some criminal trials to nothing more than games 
for planting the seeds of reversible error into the appellate record. 28 Crim-
inal defense attorneys played the game by allowing, and sometimes inten-
18. ld. 
19. !d. 
20. In presenting his defense, Mr. Campbell denied the charge, denied making the statement 
to the officer and solicited circumstantial evidence from two witnesses making it less likely he 
committed the crime. ld. at 708. 
21. ld. at 707-08. 
22. ld. at 707, 715. 
23. !d. 
24. On the contrary, the Missouri Supreme Court found that the evidence was sufficient to 
support the conviction. ld. at 707-08. 
25. ld. at 707-10 (emphasis added). At the time of trial, the Missouri constitution served 
as the governing authority on criminal procedure. It provided that: 
All writs and process shall run and all prosecutions shall be conducted in the name of 
the 'state of Missouri'; all writs shall be attested by the clerk of the court from which 
they shall be issued; and all indictments shall conclude, 'against the peace and dignity 
of the state.' 
Id. at 709 (citing Mo. CONST. art. VI, § 38 (repealed 1945)). 
26. Like Campbell, in Williams v. State, 27 Wis. 402 (1871), the defendant's conviction 
was reversed because the indictment read "against the peace of the State of Wisconsin" instead of 
the required "against the peace and dignity of the State." In People v. Vice, 21 Cal. 345 (1863), 
the defendant's conviction for robbery was reversed because the charging indictment had not 
alleged that the property in question did not belong to the defendant. See also Robert W. Calvert, 
The Development of the Doctrine of Hannless Error in Texas, 31 TEX. L. REV. 1, 13-15 (1952) 
(detailing the history and development of the harmless error doctrine in the state of Texas). 
27. Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 759 (1946). 
28. ld. 
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tionally placing, any technical defect available into the trial record.29 If 
the defendant was later convicted, the technical error would result in a 
reversal of the conviction on appeal. Then, after the appellate reversal, 
the game resumed on retrial. 30 
This "gamesmanship" caused both "widespread and deep" concern 
about the criminal justice process.31 Responding to these concerns, Con-
gress passed § 269 of the Act of February 29, 1919, which provided: 
On the hearing of any appeal, certiorari, writ of error, or mo-
tion for a new trial, in any case, civil or criminal, the court 
shall give judgment after an examination of the en tire record 
before the court, without regard to technical errors, defects, or 
exceptions which do not affect the substantive rights of the 
parties.32 
This law, and others like it/3 came to be known as harmless error rules. 
Underlying these rules is the belief that some errors occurring during the 
trial process do not affect the outcome. As explained by Justice Rutledge: 
The general object [of the harmless error rule] was simple: To 
substitute judgment for [the] automatic application ofrules; to 
preserve review as a check upon arbitrary action and essential 
unfairness in trials, but at the same time to make the process 
perform that function without giving men fairly convicted the 
multiplicity ofloopholes which any highly rigid and minutely 
detailed scheme of errors, especially in relation to procedure, 
will engender and reflect in a printed record.34 
To meet this broad objective, the harmless error rule was written in 
broad, general terms. 35 However, because of the many types of errors and 
the complexity inherent in analyzing each error, there was, and continues 
to be, difficulty in applying the rule. And the requirement that each error 
be analyzed in the context in which it occurred adds to that difficulty. 
29. /d. 
30. /d. 
31. /d. 
32. Act of February 26, 1919, ch. 48, 40 Stat. 1181, JUDICIAL CODE § 269, 28 U.S.C. §391 
(1919) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 2111 (1996)). 
33. By 1967, the year in which the Supreme Court found Constitutional errors could be 
harmless, every state had enacted harmless error rules. See, e.g., Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 
18, 21-22 (1967). 
34. Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 759-60. 
35. /d. 
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As the Court observed in Kotteakos, "[j]udgment, the play of impres-
sion and conviction along with intelligence, varies with judges 
and ... circumstance."36 In simplest terms, "[w]hat may be [a] technical 
[issue in] one [trial might be] substantial [in] another; what [is] minor or 
unimportant in one setting [may be] crucial in another.'m Written in such 
general language, the rule provided little guidance as to how broadly the 
harmless error doctrine was to be applied. Similarly, the texts of modern 
rules offer no additional guidance. Under the current standard, Federal 
Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(a), "[a]ny error, defect, irregularity, or 
variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded. "38 
Similarly, the U.S. Code provides: "On hearing of any appeal writ or 
certiori in any case, the court shall give judgment after an examination of 
the record without regard to errors or defects which do not affect the sub-
stantial rights of the parties. "39 
As was true of the originally enacted legislation, the modern rules 
leave open for judicial interpretation the types of errors which affect the 
substantial rights of criminal defendants. Most critically, the text of the 
rules leaves unresolved whether a criminal defendant's Constitutional 
rights are within the boundaries of what the harmless error rule labels 
"substantial rights." 
Until the 1960s, it was presumed that violating a defendant's Consti-
tutional rights "affected" his or her "substantial rights." Therefore, Con-
stitutional errors were immune from harmless error analysis.40 After all, 
what rights are more basic and substantial than Constitutional rights? 
Nevertheless, in 1967, some forty-eight years after Congress passed the 
first federal harmless error rule, the Supreme Court held that the violation 
of some Constitutional rights could be subjected to harmless error analy-
sis.41 In Chapman v. Califomia, 42 the Supreme Court applied harmless 
36. ld. at 761. 
37. ld. 
38. FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a). 
39. 28 u.s.c. § 2111 (1996). 
40. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 42 (1967) (Stewart, J., concurring in the result); 
Philip J. Mause, Harmless Constitutional Error: The Implications of Chapman v. California, 53 
MINN. L. REv. 519, 520 (1969). 
41. Chapman, 386 U.S. at 22. However, the Supreme Court had been asked to determine 
whether the harmless error doctrine was applicable to Constitutional violations four years earlier 
in Fahy v. Connecticut, where the Court declined to squarely address the issue. 375 U.S. 85 
(1963). The Court reasoned such a determination was unnecessary because, in this particular case, 
the error was not harmless. ld. at 86. The Court reversed the conviction, concluding there was a 
reasonable possibility that the illegally obtained evidence introduced into the trial might have 
contributed to the defendant's conviction. !d. at 86·87. 
Ironically, the opposite approach to decision-making frequently appears in harmless error cases. 
The reviewing court sidesteps an issue on the premise that even if it was error, it is irrelevant 
because any such error was harmless. While judicial economy and the theory that the Court should 
only decide those issues dispositive to the case are not to be ignored, strict adherence to these 
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error analysis to the violation of Mr. Chapman's right to remain silent.43 
The prosecution violated the right by improperly commenting on the de-
fendant's decision not to testify.44 
The Court concluded the harmless error doctrine applied by examin-
ing the question as a matter of first impression. 45 Yet the majority opinion 
admitted that prior cases had held some rights were so basic to a fair trial 
that their violation could never be harmless. 46 Indeed, Justice Stweart' s 
Chapman concurrence discusses the earlier cases.47 
In holding that some Constitutional errors could be harmless, the 
Chapman Court characterized the role of the harmless error rule as pre-
venting the setting aside of convictions "for small errors or defects that 
have little, if any, likelihood of having changed the result of the trial."48 
Implicit in the Court's reasoning was the belief that the violation of a de-
fendant's Constitutional rights could, at least in some instances, amount 
to such an insignificant error. As support for this conclusion, the Court 
observed that, in addition to the federal harmless error rule passed by 
Congress, all fifty states had also enacted harmless error rules. 49 Like the 
federal rule, none of the state rules made a facial distinction between fed-
eral, Constitutional and other errors.50 Based on this absence of a statu-
tory distinction, the Court explained there may be Constitutional errors 
which, under the circumstances of a particular case, "are so unimportant 
and insignificant that they may, consistent with the Federal Constitution, 
be deemed harmless" and which therefore do not require a defendant's 
conviction to be automatically reversed. 51 
For purposes of analyzing errors under the harmless error doctrine, a 
Constitutional error is harmless if the reviewing court is convinced, be-
yond a reasonable doubt, that the error did not contribute to the convic-
tion. 52 In terms of allocating the burden of proof, the party benefiting 
from the error carries the burden. 53 Thus, in criminal cases, the prosecu-
tion has the burden of convincing the reviewing court, beyond a reason-
principles in the harmless error arena goes too far. This is an issue discussed in greater detail in 
Part V, A. 
42. 386 U.S. at 22. 
43. !d. 
44. !d. at 25-26. 
45. !d. at 24. 
46. !d. at 23 n.S. 
47. !d. at 42 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
48. Id at 22. 
49. !d. at 21-22. 
50. Jd. at 22. Other errors would include, for example, errors of state or federal statutes or 
rules. 
51. !d. 
52. !d. at 23-24. 
53. !d. at 24. 
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able doubt, that the Constitutional error complained of did not contribute 
to the defendant's conviction. 
In fashioning the rule, the majority admitted that appellate courts are 
not ordinarily placed in the position of making such original determina-
tions. 54 However, because the Court considered the harmless error stan-
dard to be familiar to all courts, the majority believed the standard to be 
workable.55 As will be seen, the standard is not workable after all. This 
task is one which cannot be reliably performed by reviewing courts and 
continued adherence to the current rule frustrates basic notions of fairness 
and justice. 
Like the harmless error rule it interpreted, the majority in Chapman 
articulated their opinion in general terms.56 The Court's holding gave no 
indication that it was limited either to the facts of the case or to comment-
ing upon a defendant's failure to testify. The Court did not articulate an 
exhaustive list of every Constitutional right that could be subjected to 
harmless error analysis. On the other hand, it did indicate that some Con-
stitutional rights may be "so basic to a fair trial" that their violation may 
never be treated as harmless. 57 In a footnote, the Court cited admitting 
coerced confessions,58 denying the defendant the right to counsel,59 and 
denying the defendant the right to an impartial judge60 as examples of 
errors to which the harmless error doctrine would not apply. 61 
In retrospect, the Chapman decision was the first crack in the dam 
controlling the flow of Constitutional errors through the appellate courts. 
That dam would soon give way. In the years following Chapman, the Su-
preme Court expanded the application of the harmless error doctrine con-
siderably and currently holds that most Constitutional errors can be harm-
less. 62 In many cases, the Court simply applied the harmless error rule 
without evaluating why the particular error should or should not be sub-
jected to it. 63 It was not until 1991 that the Court articulated a test for de 
54. !d. 
55. !d. 
56. !d. 
57. !d. at 23. Note that the Supreme Court uses the terms "coerced confession" and 
"involuntary confession" interchangeably "by way of convenient shorthand." Arizona v. Fulminante, 
499 U.S. 279, 287 n.3 (1991) (citing Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 207 (1960)); Chapman, 
386 U.S. at 23. 
58. See, e.g., Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958). 
59. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
60. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927). 
61. Chapman, 386 U.S. at 23 n.8. 
62. Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 306. 
63. Foc exanvle, in Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 550 (1968), the Court, citing 
Chapman, decided with only one sentence of discussion that the erroneous admission of evidence 
obtained contrary to the Fourth Amendment could in some circumstances be harmless error. 
Similarly, in Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1970), the Supreme Court applied the 
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termining whether a particular right was, or was not, subject to the rule. 
Instead, the expansion occurred on a case by case basis. Examples of this 
expansion include: allowing unconstitutionally overbroad jury instruc-
tions at the sentencing phase of a capital case, 64 violating the Counsel 
Clause of the Sixth Amendment through the admission of evidence at the 
sentencing stage of a capital case, 65 allowing a jury instruction containing 
an erroneous conclusive presumption, 66 allowing the jury to receive an 
instruction misstating an element of the offense, 67 allowing the jury to 
hear an instruction containing an erroneous rebuttable presumption/8 er-
roneously excluding the defendant's testimony about the circumstances 
under which he (or she) confessed,69 erroneously restricting the right of a 
defendant to cross-examine a witness for bias and thereby violating the 
Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment/0 denying the defendant 
the right to be present at trial,71 allowing the prosecution's improper com-
ment upon the defendant's silence consequently violating the Self Incrim-
ination Clause of the Fifth Amendment,72 following a statute improperly 
forbidding the trial judge from giving the jury an instruction on a lesser 
included offense in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment,73 failing to instruct the jury on the presumption of the defen-
dant's innocence/4 admitting identification evidence in violation of the 
Counsel Clause of the Sixth Amendment/5 admitting evidence obtained 
in violation of the Fourth Amendmene6 and denying a defendant counsel 
at a preliminary hearing in violation of the Confrontation Clause of the 
Sixth Amendment.77 All these errors came within the scope of harmless 
error review as a result of the Chapman decision. 
Finally, in Arizona v. Fulminante78 the Court attempted to develop a 
more concrete structure to the general rule frrst articulated in Chambers. 
As already discussed, Chambers was written in broad, general terms: 
harmless error rule to the denial of counsel at a preliminary hearing without articulating any 
underlying rationale. 
64. Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 752-54 (1990). 
65. Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 306 (citing Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249 (1988)). 
66. Carella v. California, 491 U.S. 263, 266 (1989). 
67. Pope v. lllinois, 481 U.S. 497, 501-04 (1987). 
68. Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 307 (citing Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570 (1986)). 
69. Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 691 (1986). 
70. Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 307(citing Delaware v. VanArsdall, 475 U.S. 673 (1986)). 
71. /d. (citing Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114, 117-18, (1983)). 
72. /d. (citing United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499 (1983)). 
73. /d. (citing Hooper v. Evans, 456 U.S. 605 (1982)). 
74. /d. (citing Kentucky v. Whorton, 441 U.S. 786 (1979)). 
75. /d. (citing Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220 (1977)). 
76. /d. (citing Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 52-53 (1970)). 
77. Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1970). 
78. 499 U.S. at 297 (1991). 
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"We conclude that there may be some [C]onstitutional errors which in the 
setting of a particular case are so unimportant and insignificant that they 
may, consistent with the Federal Constitution, be deemed harmless, not 
requiring the automatic reversal of the conviction. "79 In Fulminante, the 
Court attempted to devise an analytical framework for determining 
whether a given Constitutional error could be subject to harmless error 
analysis. The Court reasoned that there are two types of Constitutional 
errors: trial errors and structural errors. 80 Under Fulminante, the category 
of the Constitutional error determines whether it is subject to the harm-
less error rule. 
According to Fulminante's majority, a trial error is a constitutionally 
erroneous admission of evidence. 81 Such errors occur during the trial pro-
cess and may, therefore, be quantitatively assessed in the context of all 
the evidence to determine whether their admission was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 82 The Supreme Court's belief that these errors are finite 
in nature renders them reviewable. In essence, the Supreme Court be-
lieves it can measure the effect of any evidentiary error, Constitutional or 
otherwise. Examples range from erroneously admitting an incorrectly 
worded indictment to allowing the jury to hear a defendant's coerced con-
fession. 
Unlike trial errors, structural errors permeate the entire trial mecha-
nism. 83 Their effect, according to the Supreme Court, is not nearly as fi-
nite as that of trial errors. Instead, they affect the trial from beginning to 
end. 84 This type of Constitutional error affects the complete framework in 
which a trial is conducted as opposed to a mere defect in the trial process 
itself. 85 Because these errors affect the reliability of the criminal trial pro-
cess as a mechanism for determining the guilt or innocence of the defen-
dant, automatic reversal is the only appropriate remedy for structural er-
rors.86 Examples of structural defects include unlawfully excluding mem-
bers of a defendant's race from grand jury proceedings, 87 denying the de-
fendant the right of self-representation at trial, 88 and violating the defen-
dant's right to a public trial.89 Further, the Fulminante majority consid-
ered depriving the defendant of counsel at trial or subjecting the defen-
79. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22 (1967). 
80. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 307-08 (1991). 
81. ld. at 310. 
82. ld. at 307-08. 
83. ld. at 310. 
84. ld. 
85. ld. 
86. ld. 
87. ld. (citing Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254 (1986)). 
88. ld. (citing McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 177-78 n.8 (1984)). 
89. ld. (citing Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 49 n.9 (1984)). 
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dant to a trial without an impartial judge as being beyond the scope of 
harmless error analysis.90 It is worth noting that these last two Constitu-
tional rights were considered so basic to a fair trial that their violation 
could never be deemed harmless by the Supreme Court in Chambers. 91 
More interestingly, the Chambers Court considered the erroneous admis-
sion of an involuntary confession to be of similar character to denying the 
defendant counsel or subjecting the defendant to trial without an impar-
tial judge. 92 
While the Chambers Court had not decided which Constitutional er-
rors were subject to harmless error analysis, the Court did state, albeit in 
dicta, that there are some Constitutional rights so basic to a fair trial that 
their violation can never be harmless error. 93 The Court cited the wrong-
ful admission of a coerced confession as one such example.94 Neverthe-
less, in applying the newly developed structural error versus trial error 
rationale, the Fulminante majority held in direct contradiction with the 
Chambers decision that even the wrongful admission of a coerced confes-
sion was subject to harmless error analysis. 95 This result followed from 
the Court's analysis of the error from within the trial versus structural 
error framework. Because the admission of a coerced confession is, ac-
cording to the Court's definition of the term, a trial error, appellate courts 
are able to measure its effect on members of the jury. 
In reaching their conclusion, the majority conceded that erroneously 
admitting involuntary confessions may have a more dramatic effect than 
other types of trial errors.96 However, the Court reasoned that this reality 
only supports the notion that such wrongful admissions will less fre-
quently be deemed harmless; it does not require "eschewing the harmless-
error test entirely."97 There are at least two major flaws with this reason-
ing. First, it incorrectly assumes that appellate courts can effectively eval-
uate the harm caused by a Constitutional error.98 Second, even if the ef-
fects of a Constitutional error could be accurately measured, applying 
harmless error analysis to such errors ignores the intangible value of Con-
stitutional rights which transcends their evidentiary value. 99 The follow-
ing section examines the distinction the Supreme Court attempts to draw 
90. !d.; Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23 n.8 (1967). 
91. Chapman, 386 U.S. at 23 n.8. 
92. !d. 
93. !d. at 23. 
94. !d. at 23 n.8. 
95. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310 (1991). 
96. !d. at 312. 
97. !d. 
98. This problem is discussed in Part IV. B. 
99. This is the subject of Part IV. C. 
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between trial and structural errors. It analyzes prior case law incon~istent 
with that distinction and concludes that the inherent value of our Consti-
tutional rights renders them indistinguishable from one another. 
III. THE COMMONALITY OF CONSTITUTIONAL ERRORS 
Although the Chapman Court held some Constitutional errors could 
be subjected to harmless error analysis, it was either unable or unwilling 
to articulate a method of analysis for determining whether a given Consti-
tutional error was within the scope of the harmless error doctrine. Instead, 
harmless error jurisprudence progressed on a case-by-case basis, some-
times with no explanation as to why a given error was subject to harmless 
error review. 100 As will be seen in the sections that follow, although the 
Supreme Court developed a means of categorizing Constitutional errors 
in Fulminante, there remains no defensible framework for determining 
which Constitutional errors, if any, should be subjected to harmless error 
analysis. Indeed, such a framework is unlikely to be developed because, 
for harmless error purposes, Constitutional errors are indistinguishable 
from one another. 
In Fulminante, Chief Justice Rhenquist attempted to frame a test for 
determining what types of Constitutional errors are subject to harmless 
error analysis. 101 As has already been noted, the Chief Justice reasoned 
there are two types of Constitutional errors, trial and structural. 102 Ac-
cording to Chief Justice Rhenquist, because trial errors can be quantita-
tively measured, they are subject to harmless error analysis. 103 Con-
versely, because structural errors permeate every aspect of the case, they 
are beyond the scope of harmless error analysis. 104 This test and its under-
lying philosophy serve as the current guide for reviewing courts. 
Chief Justice Rhenquist formulated this test by examining various 
harmless error cases from Chapman to Fulminante in an attempt to syn-
thesize the results. However, the conclusion he reached was not sup-
ported by those cases. On the contrary, prior case law was inconsistent 
with Chief Justice Rhenquist' s trial versus structural error distinction. As 
100. For example, in Bumper v. North Carolina, the Court, citing Chapman, in a single 
sentence indicated that the erroneous admission of evidence obtained contrary to the Fourth 
Amendment was not harmless error. 391 U.S. 543, 550 (1968). In doing so, the Court assumed, 
without stating any rationale, that violating a defendant's Fourth Amendment rights could in some 
circumstances be harmless error. See also, Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. I, 10-11 (1970) 
(applying the harmless error doctrine, without delineating a rationale, to the denial of counsel at 
the preliminary hearing). 
101. This issue is discussed in greater detail in Part II. See Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 
279 (1991). 
102. Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 307-08. 
103. /d. 
104. /d. 
73] RETURNING TO A RULE OF AUTOMATIC REVERSAL 85 
such, the distinction deviates without explanation from prior case law. 
Given the precedent prior to Fulminante, the finding of a trial versus 
structural error distinction was an adventure beyond, and in conflict with, 
prior precedent. 105 
Prior harmless error cases could not be neatly classified into trial and 
structural categories. 106 An example, used by Justice White in his 
Fulminante dissent, clearly demonstrates the fallacy of the trial versus 
structural error distinction in prior case law. Prior to Fulminante, the 
Court determined that the failure of a trial judge to instruct a jury regard-
ing the presumption of innocence was susceptible to harmless error anal-
ysis.107 However, the very similar error of failing to instruct the jury on 
the standard of proof in a criminal case being beyond a reasonable doubt 
could not be analyzed under the harmless error doctrine. 108 As explained 
by Justice White, "[t]hese cases cannot be reconciled by labeling the for-
mer 'trial error' and the latter not, for both concern the exact same stage 
in the trial proceedings."109 Justice White's point is both obvious and 
compelling. Prior Supreme Court cases refused to extend harmless error 
analysis to errors clearly within the trial error category of Chief Justice 
Rhenquist's test. 
Perhaps even more problematic in the trial versus structural error 
framework is the incorrect assumption that a reviewing court's only con-
cern is whether the error can be "quantified." Indeed, the common bond 
shared by all Constitutional rights is their significance in our system of 
justice. This truth is best demonstrated in the early cases refusing to apply 
the harmless error rule to Constitutional errors. 
In the pre-Chapman era, reversal was required when a conviction 
could have possibly rested on a Constitutionally impermissible ground, 
even though a valid alternative ground existed for sustaining the ver-
dict.110 For example, when a jury was instructed as to an erroneous pre-
sumption, the conviction had to be overturned, despite ample independent 
evidence sustaining the verdict. 111 Indeed, in the pre-Chapman era, the 
Supreme Court rejected the notion that erroneously admitting a coerced 
confession could be harmless even when there was other properly admit-
ted evidence of the defendant's guilt. 112 These cases clearly recognize the 
105. This is a point which is addressed in greater detail in Part IV, A. 
106. Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 291 (White, J., dissenting). 
107. !d. (citing Kentucky v. Whorton, 441 U.S. 786 (1979)). 
108. !d. (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 320 n.14 (1979)). 
109. !d. 
110. Strombecg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 367-68 (1931); Williams v. North Carolina, 317 
U.S. 287, 292 (1942). 
111. Bollenbach v. United States, 326 U.S. 607, 614-15 (1946). 
112. Lynumn v. lllinois, 372 U.S. 528, 537 (1963) (citing other pre-Chapman confession 
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inherent value of Constitutional rights, demonstrating that the signifi-
cance of Constitutional errors extends well beyond considerations of evi-
dentiary value. 113 
A more encompassing synthesis of prior case law reveals that a valid 
distinction cannot be drawn between those Constitutional errors which 
are currently subject to harmless error analysis and those beyond the doc-
trine's application. Admittedly, criminal trials need not be perfect, but, at 
a minimum, every criminal defendant is entitled to a fair trial. 114 As the 
following discussion demonstrates, allowing a Constitutional error to oc-
cur prevents the defendant from receiving a fair trial. 
Advocates of applying the harmless error doctrine to Constitutional 
cases reason that a fair trial is possible because the error, despite being of 
Constitutional proportion, may nevertheless not contribute to the verdict. 
Even if such a proposition where theoretically true, the appellate court 
system is simply not equipped to accurately measure the effect of such 
errors, and therefore the occurrence of a Constitutional error in a criminal 
defendant's trial should mandate automatic reversal. Further, even if such 
accurate analysis were possible, reviewing courts would be ill-advised to 
engage in it because doing so compromises the inherent value of our Con-
stitutional rights. 
IV. THE PROBLEMS WITH APPLYING HARMLESS ERROR ANALYSIS TO 
CONSTITUTIONAL ERRORS 
This section addresses the problems with the current harmless error 
rule, beginning with a critical analysis of how harmless error was initially 
applied to Constitutional errors, thus violating the doctrine of stare 
decisis. Next, it explores the impossibility of an appellate court truly be-
ing able to measure the impact of a Constitutional error upon a jury. And 
finally, it illustrates that even if such analysis were theoretically possible, 
it should not be performed because doing so would diminish the inherent 
value of our Constitutional rights. 
A. Subjecting Constitutional Errors to The Harmless Error Doctrine 
Violates The Principle of Stare Decisis 
Applying the harmless error doctrine to Constitutional errors often 
required violating the principle of stare decisis. 115 Stare decisis "promotes 
cases). 
113. This topic is the subject of Part IV. C. 
114. "As we have stressed on more than one occasion, the constitution entitles a criminal 
defendants to a fair trial, not a perfect one." Deleware v. VanArsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681 (1986). 
115. Stare decisis means to "abide by, or adhere to, decided cases." BlACK'S LAW 
DICfiONARY 1406 (6th Ed. 1990). 
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the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal princi-
ples, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual 
and perceived integrity of the judicial process."116 "[E]ven in 
[C]onstitutional cases, the doctrine carries such persuasive force that we 
have always required a departure from precedent to be supported by some 
'special justification. "'117 Such "special justifications" include the 
unworkability of the precedent or a determination that the precedent was 
badly reasoned. 118 Neither of these justifications was applied or discussed 
in decisions where the Court departed from prior holdings by allowing a 
Constitutional error to be subject to the harmless error rule. By departing 
from precedent without justification, the Court failed to promote the con-
sistent development of legal principles, and undermined the actual and 
perceived integrity of the judicial process. 
As already noted in Part II, the Supreme Court in Chapman ap-
proached the application of the harmless error doctrine to a Constitutional 
error as a matter of first impression. 119 In doing so, the majority examined 
the express language of the harmless error rule120 and determined that the 
rule made no facial distinction between Constitutional and other types of 
errors. 121 Because the harmless error rule failed to distinguish between 
types of errors, the Court held the rule applicable to Constitutional er-
rors.122 
Treating the issue as a question of first impression gave the major-
ity's opinion the appearance of being soundly grounded in statutory inter-
pretation. However, as Justice Stewart explained in his concurrence, the 
issue was not truly one of first impression. 123 On the contrary, precedent 
indicated the harmless error doctrine was not applicable to Constitutional 
errors. 124 In a long line of cases prior to Chapman involving a variety of 
116. United States v. International Bus. Mach. Corp., 116 S. Ct. 1793, 1801 (1996) (citing 
Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991)). 
117. ld. (citing Payne, 501 U.S. at 842 (Souter, J., concurring) (quoting Arizona v. Rumsey, 
467 u.s. 203, 212 (1984))). 
118. ld. (citing Payne, 501 U.S. at 827 (1991)); See Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 665 
(1944). 
119. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 42 (1967) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
120. The majority examined both sources of the harmless error doctrine, 28 U.S.C. § 2111 
and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(a), and found that neither of the rules made a 
distinction between federal Constitutional errors and errors of state Jaw or federal statutes and rules. 
Chapman, 386 U.S. at 22 (1967). 28 U.S.C. § 2111 (1996) provided "[o]n the hearing of any 
appeal writ or certiori in any case, the court shall give judgement after an examination of the 
record without regard to errors or defects which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties." 
The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provided "[a]ny error, defect, irregularity or variance 
which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded." FED R. CRIM. P. 52{a). 
121. Chapman, 386 U.S. at 22. 
122. ld. 
123. ld. at 42 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
124. ld. 
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Constitutional claims reaching the Supreme Court from both federal and 
state prosecutions, the Court "steadfastly rejected any notion that consti-
tutional violations might be disregarded on the ground that they were 
'harmless.' "125 
By treating the issue as a matter of first impression, the Chapman 
majority circumvented the need to find a special justification for depart-
ing from established precedent. While the Chapman decision represented 
the first time the Supreme Court violated the doctrine of stare decisis in 
the harmless error context, 126 it was by no means the last. This practice of 
deviating precedent continued as the scope of harmless error application 
expanded. 
In what is perhaps the most apparent instance of deviating from pre-
cedent, Chief Justice Rhenquist, writing for the majority in Fulminante, 
held that even the erroneous admission of a coerced confession was sus-
ceptible to harmless error analysis. 127 However, unlike the Court in 
Chambers, Chief Justice Rhenquist did not avoid the issue of stare 
decisis. Instead, he denied that the precedent mandated a rule of auto-
matic reversal. 128 
Chief Justice Rhenquist claimed that the Chapman decision did not 
stand for the proposition that a coerced confession was subject to auto-
matic reversal. He reasoned that the language, "[a]lthough our prior cases 
have indicated," combined with the fact that the cases were included in a 
footnote rather than the text of the opinion, was more appropriately re-
garded as a historical reference to the holdings of the cited cases than a 
mandate that they be excluded from the newly articulated rule of harm-
less error application.129 As additional support for the position, the Chief 
Justice reasoned that his opinion in Payne v. Arkansas, 130 holding coerced 
confessions were not subject to harmless error analysis, involved a more 
lenient version of the harmless error rule than the one analyzed in Chap-
man. The test considered in Payne allowed the affrrmation of a convic-
tion if the properly admitted evidence, independent of the involuntary 
confession, was sufficient to sustain the verdict. 131 
Viewed objectively, neither Payne nor Chapman support the 
Fulminante majority's distinction. First, the majority in Chapman made 
no mention of the more strict beyond a reasonable doubt standard in ex-
125. Id. 
126. However, the Court had previously considered the possibility. See Fahy v. Connecticut, 
375 u.s. 85 (1963). 
127. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 312 (1991). 
128. Id. at 308-09. 
129. Id. at 308. 
130. 365 u.s. 560 (1958). 
131. Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 309. 
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panding the harmless error doctrine to Constitutional errors. 132 The ex-
pansion of the rule was premised upon the question being one of ftrst im-
pression and therefore resolvable as a matter of statutory interpretation. 133 
Second, Justice Stewart's concurrence clearly articulates the rationale 
of the earlier cases refusing to extend the harmless error doctrine to cases 
involving the erroneous admission of coerced confessions. Prior to 
Fulminante, when an involuntary confession was introduced at trial, the 
Court consistently reversed the conviction regardless of any other evi-
dence of guilt. 134 In those earlier cases, the argument that erroneously ad-
mitting a coerced confession could amount to a harmless error was re-
jected as "an impermissible doctrine. "135 This conclusion was not limited 
to one narrowly decided case. In fact, the Supreme Court had consistently 
recognized the principle. 136 Most significantly, the Court had previously 
held that even when a confession is completely ''unnecessary" to a con-
viction, the defendant is entitled to "a new trial free of constitutional infrr-
mity."137 
Chief Justice Rhenquist' s distinction of Payne v. Arkansas on the 
grounds that it addressed a different harmless error standard is simply not 
supported by the Payne Court's reasoning. The Payne Court evaluated a 
confession which it determined had been coerced in reprehensible fash-
ion. 138 In response, Arkansas argued that the conviction need not be re-
versed due to adequate evidence independent of the confession and sup-
porting the verdict. 139 The Court found Arkansas' argument without 
merit, reasoning that where a coerced confession was admitted into evi-
dence in a jury trial, "no one can say what credit and weight the jury gave 
to the confession. "140 Therefore, the mere fact that the coerced confession 
132. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 21-26 (1967). 
133. /d. at 21-24. 
134. /d. 
135. /d. (citing Lynumn v. lllinois, 372 U.S. 528, 537 (1963)). 
136. See Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 376-77 (1964); Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 
503, 518-19 (1963); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 324 (1959); Payne v. Arkansas, 365 U.S. 
560, 568 (1958); Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 404 (1945). 
137. Haynes, 373 U.S. at 518-19. 
138. The defendant, "a mentally dull 19-year-old [African American) youth" was (1) arrested 
without a warrant, (2) denied a hearing before a magistrate at which he would have been advised 
of his right to remain silent and his right to counsel, as required by Arkansas statutes, (3) not 
advised of his right to remain silent or of his right to counsel, (4) held inconununicado for three 
days, without counsel, advisor or friend, and though members of his family tried to see him they 
were turned away, (5) refused permission to make even one telephone call, (6) denied food for long 
periods and, finally, (7) was told by the chief of police "that there would be 30 or 40 people there 
in a few minutes that wanted to get him." Payne, 356 U.S. at 567. 
139. /d. 
140. /d. at 568. 
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was admitted into evidence was sufficient to warrant reversal. 141 No fur-
ther analysis was necessary. 142 
Similarly, in Lynumn v. Illinois, the Court heard argument for the 
state of lllinois which it interpreted as suggesting that the erroneous ad-
mission of a coerced confession could be rendered harmless in light of 
the other evidence of Lynumn's guilt. 143 The Court, quoting Payne v. Ar-
kansas, found such a suggestion to be an "impermissible doctrine."144 The 
Lynumn Court relied not upon the standard of proof required by the harm-
less error rule in question, but upon the notion that even if there is suffi-
cient evidence independent of the coerced confession, admitting a co-
erced confession into evidence, over the objections of the defendant, "vi-
tiates the judgment because it violates the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment."145 
Likewise, in Haynes v. Washington, the Court reversed Haynes' con-
viction despite the "substantial independent evidence" indicating Haynes 
was guilty. 146 Although the Supreme Court was "mindful" of the inde-
pendent evidence, it did not affect the decision to reverse. 147 Once again, 
the Court refused to evaluate what effect the error may have had on the 
jury's deliberations. 148 Instead, the mere admission of the coerced confes-
sion sufficiently poisoned the process and warranted a reversal of the 
conviction. 149 
The Supreme Court's earlier refusal to apply the harmless error doc-
trine to coerced confessions is also consistent with the Court's pre-Chap-
man treatment of other Constitutional errors. 150 The rationale underlying 
141. /d. 
142. /d. 
143. 372 u.s. 528, 537 (1963). 
144. Id. 
145. /d. (quoting Payne, 365 U.S. at 568); See Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 324 
(1959). 
146. 373 U.S. 503, 518 (1963). Haynes had been charged with robbing a gasoline service 
station. /d. at 505. He was arrested within close proximity to the service station within one half 
hour of the crimes commission. /d. He had also been identified by witnesses in a police line-up 
as one of the robbers. /d. 
147. /d. at 518. 
148. See /d. at 518-19. In Haynes the Court noted that many convictions warranting reversal 
under the Due Process Clause involve the use of confessions obtained impermissibly though 
independent evidence corroborated the accuracy of the coerced confession. /d. (quoting Rogers v. 
Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 541 (1961)). However, the independent evidence does not affect the 
conclusion that the confession was improperly induced. /d. 
Adopting the language of Rogers v. Richmond, the Court refused to express an opinion as to 
the guilt or innocence of Haynes because that issue was up to the jury to decide in a trial free of 
Constitutional infirmity. Id. 
149. /d. 
150. In addition to the involuntary confession issue, Justice Stewart cited several other areas 
in which the Court had previously refused to engage in harmless error analysis. Chapman v. 
California, 386 U.S. 18, 43 (1967) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
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each decision was that Constitutional rights are "too fundamental and 
absolute to allow courts to indulge in nice calculations as to the amount 
of prejudice arising from [their] denial."151 For example, prior to Chap-
man, denying a defendant counsel at a critical stage of the case required 
automatic reversal. 152 Conducting a trial wherein the trial judge's remu-
neration was based on a pecuniary interest in the outcome of the case re-
quired reversal and a new trial even if the defendant failed to show any 
prejudice and where the proof of guilt was clear. 153 Trying a defendant in 
a community that has been exposed to publicity that is highly adverse to 
the defendant mandated reversal regardless of whether the information 
influenced the jury. 154 If a jury received an instruction containing an un-
constitutional presumption, the defendant received a new trial regardless 
of whether there was sufficient evidence apart from the presumption sup-
porting the conviction. 155 Likewise, a defendant was entitled to a reversal 
of his conviction, regardless of prejudice, if purposeful discrimination 
occurred during grand or petit jury selection.156 More generally, a convic-
tion based upon unconstitutional grounds required reversal even when a 
valid alternative ground for the conviction was present. 157 
The common theme through all of these early cases is that the rejec-
tion of the harmless error rule did not turn on the evidentiary impact of 
the error.158 In fact, Haynes v. Washington specifically contradicts such a 
proposition. 159 In addition to the confession found inadmissible by the 
Court, the defendant in Haynes had proffered two prior confessions, both 
of which were admitted without dispute. 160 The prosecution also offered 
"substantial independent evidence" of the defendant's guilt. 161 In terms of 
the role the inadmissible confession played in the overall proceedings, the 
Court accepted the prosecution's contention that the inadmissible confes-
sion "played little if any role in the conviction."162 The Court found the 
151. !d. (citing Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 76 (1942)). 
152. /d. (citing Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 55 (1961), and White v. Maryland, 373 
u.s. 59, 60 (1963)). 
153. /d. (citing Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 535 (1927)). 
154. /d. at 4344 (citing Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 351-52 (1966)); See also &tes 
v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 542-44 (1965) (Warren, C.J., concurring); !d. at 593-94 (Harlan, J., 
concurring); cf Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723, 727 (1963). 
155. Chapman, 386 U.S. at 44 (citing Bollenbach v. United States, 326 U.S. 607, 614-15 
(1946)). 
156. /d. (citing Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545 (1967)). 
157. /d. (citing Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 367-68 (1931); Williams v. North 
Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 292 (1942)). 
158. /d. at 43 n.l. 
159. 373 U.S. 503 (1963). 
160. /d. at 518-19. 
161. /d. 
162. Chapman, 386 U.S. at 43 n.l. 
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procedures of extracting the coerced confession not only impermissible, 
but also unwarranted because the confession was unnecessary. 163 
Indeed, in many of the cases in which the command of the Due 
Process Clause has compelled us to reverse state convictions 
involving the use of confessions obtained by impermissible 
methods, independent corroborating evidence left little doubt 
of the truth ofwhat the defendant had confessed. Despite such 
verification, confessions were found to be the product of Con-
stitutionally impermissible methods in their inducement. 164 
In spite of all the independent corroborating evidence of the defendant's 
guilt, the Court nevertheless reversed the conviction. The reversal oc-
curred not because of the erroneous confession's evidentiary weight, but 
because the innocence or guilt of the defendant is for the jury to decide in 
a trial free from Constitutional infirmity. 165 
As additional support for the proposition that Justice Rhenquist' s trial 
versus structural error distinction violated the doctrine of stare decisis, 
four Justices, 166 dissenting in Fulminante noted that the majority's hold-
ing abandoned what had been an "axiomatic" rule of reversal. 167 As a 
practical matter, the majority overruled a vast body of precedent without 
articulating any persuasive justification. 168 In applying the harmless error 
doctrine to coerced confessions, the majority dislodged a "fundamental 
tenant" of the criminal justice system. 169 
In sum, the initial application of the harmless error doctrine to Con-
stitutional errors170 constituted a violation of stare decisis, creating a pat-
tern that continued in subsequent cases. 171 In departing from settled pre-
cedent, the Court failed to articulate any special justification warranting 
the expansion of the harmless error doctrine to Constitutional errors. 
"Judges, more than most, should understand the value of adherence to 
settled procedures. By adopting a set of fair procedures [such as auto-
matic reversal], and then adhering to them, courts of law ensure that jus-
tice is administered with an even hand."172 In choosing not to follow set 
163. Haynes, 373 U.S. at 519. 
164. /d. at 518 (quoting Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 541 (1961)). 
165. /d. 
166. Justices White, Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 
288 (1991). 
167. /d. 
168. /d. 
169. /d. 
170. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). 
171. See e.g., Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279. 
172. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 962 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting in part, 
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tied procedures, the Supreme Court allowed the expansion of harmless 
error and frustrated the very goals stare decisis is designed to further. 
As will be seen, the expansion of the harmless error doctrine poi-
soned both the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process. 173 
Applying the harmless error doctrine to Constitutional violations took 
appellate courts down a road better left untraveled. Not only were there 
no convincing reasons for such a misguided journey, but there are com-
pelling reasons for returning to a rule of automatic reversal. 
B. The Appellate Court Cannot Effectively Weigh the Impact 
of the Constitutional Error. 
Perhaps the greatest difficulty facing an appellate tribunal in applying 
the harmless error doctrine to any type of error, Constitutional or other-
wise, is evaluating the actual effect the error had on the lower court pro-
ceedings. Because Constitutional errors violate the core principles upon 
which the criminal justice system is based, their actual effect is particu-
larly difficult to evaluate. Indeed, most rights protected by the Constitu-
tion are protected to such a high degree because they play such a crucial 
role in people's lives generally and in the criminal justice process in par-
ticular.174 As the Court noted in Glaser v. United States, Constitutional 
rights are "too fundamental and absolute to allow courts to indulge in 
nice calculations as to the amount of prejudice arising from their de-
nial."175 Because Constitutional rights play such a central role in the crim-
inal trial process, determining what effect a Constitutional error had on 
the trial's outcome is an analysis which cannot be reliably performed. 
As a practical matter, asking an appellate court to use a trial tran-
script to determine the effect of a particular Constitutional error is asking 
the impossible. The appellate court cannot observe the reactions of the 
witnesses, the defense lawyer, the prosecutor, the judge or, most impor-
tantly, the jurors to a Constitutional violation from merely reading the 
trial transcript. The transcript communicates only the words spoken and 
the evidence presented during trial. Such transcripts do not, and cannot, 
communicate the manner in which the words were spoken or the way in 
which the evidence was presented during the trial. For example, the trial 
concurring in part). 
173. See United States v. International Bus. Mach. Corp., 116 S. Ct. 1793, 1801 (1996) 
(citing Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991)). 
174. Examples are both obvious and numerous. Search and seizure, the right to counsel, the 
right to a trial by jury, the right to an impartial judge and the right to have one's guilt proven 
beyond a reasonable doubt are just a few of many possible examples. 
175. 315 U.S. 60, 76 (1942). Although the Court was not specifically addressing the issue 
of coerced confessions, the reasoning remains equally true regardless of the Constitutional right 
being considered. 
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The absence of this vital information makes requiring the appellate 
court to determine the effect of a Constitutional error based on the trial 
transcript similar to asking a movie critic to evaluate a movie based only 
on the words as written in the screenplay. A screenplay communicates 
only the dialogue of the movie- the words spoken by the actors. As 
such, the screenplay conveys only one small component of the movie. 
Equally important are the nonverbal communications of the actors. How 
something is said is often times more important than the words which are 
actually spoken. In fact, because many words have multiple meanings, the 
meaning of what the actor is saying can sometimes only be determined by 
observing how it is said. Without evaluating these important nonverbal 
considerations along with the dialogue, a complete understanding of the 
movie is virtually impossible. While an accomplished critic could formu-
late some opinion about the movie's merit from the small amount of in-
formation conveyed by the screenplay, any such opinion would be radi-
cally more speculative than one formed after watching the movie itself. 
Criminal trials are no different. The words spoken into the record 
comprise only one component of the trial process. As is true in movies, 
the way something is said in the courtroom is just as important as the 
words that are spoken. Similar to the nonverbal messages conveyed by 
movie actors, the nonverbal communications of the witnesses, the law-
yers and the judge go unrecorded in the trial transcript. These unrecorded 
messages have the potential for tremendous influence on members of the 
jury. Without this revealing information, a reviewing court is ill-equipped 
to accurately evaluate the effect a Constitutional error had on the trial 
process. More to the central point, without such information, the review-
ing court cannot be sure, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the error did not 
affect the trials outcome. 
To take the analogy one step further, consider an important difference 
between the movie critic and the reviewing court judge. Unlike the critic 
whose assigned task is to analyze the screenplay's affect on him or her, 
the reviewing court must attempt to decipher from the transcript how a 
Constitutional error affected other people: the members of the jury. In 
this regard, reviewing courts are without yet another important vital piece 
of information- the nonverbal reactions of the jury to the Constitutional 
error. 
While jurors do not always react outwardly to the evidence they hear, 
sometimes they do. Many attorneys hire experts to monitor jurors' out-
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transcript makes no distinction between testimony offered in a boisterous, 
hostile or angry manner and testimony offered in a shameful, bashful or 
reluctant manner. Despite their absence from the trial record, the influ-
ence of these and other details have on individual jurors and the jury as a 
whole can be tremendous. 
The absence of this vital information makes requiring the appellate 
court to determine the effect of a Constitutional error based on the trial 
transcript similar to asking a movie critic to evaluate a movie based only 
on the words as written in the screenplay. A screenplay communicates 
only the dialogue of the movie- the words spoken by the actors. As 
such, the screenplay conveys only one small component of the movie. 
Equally important are the nonverbal communications of the actors. How 
something is said is often times more important than the words which are 
actually spoken. In fact, because many words have multiple meanings, the 
meaning of what the actor is saying can sometimes only be determined by 
observing how it is said. Without evaluating these important nonverbal 
considerations along with the dialogue, a complete understanding of the 
movie is virtually impossible. While an accomplished critic could formu-
late some opinion about the movie's merit from the small amount of in-
formation conveyed by the screenplay, any such opinion would be radi-
cally more speculative than one formed after watching the movie itself. 
Criminal trials are no different. The words spoken into the record 
comprise only one component of the trial process. As is true in movies, 
the way something is said in the courtroom is just as important as the 
words that are spoken. Similar to the nonverbal messages conveyed by 
movie actors, the nonverbal communications of the witnesses, the law-
yers and the judge go unrecorded in the trial transcript. These unrecorded 
messages have the potential for tremendous influence on members of the 
jury. Without this revealing information, a reviewing court is ill-equipped 
to accurately evaluate the effect a Constitutional error had on the trial 
process. More to the central point, without such information, the review-
ing court cannot be sure, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the error did not 
affect the trials outcome. 
To take the analogy one step further, consider an important difference 
between the movie critic and the reviewing court judge. Unlike the critic 
whose assigned task is to analyze the screenplay's affect on him or her, 
the reviewing court must attempt to decipher from the transcript how a 
Constitutional error affected other people: the members of the jury. In 
this regard, reviewing courts are without yet another important vital piece 
of information- the nonverbal reactions of the jury to the Constitutional 
error. 
While jurors do not always react outwardly to the evidence they hear, 
sometimes they do. Many attorneys hire experts to monitor jurors' out-
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ward reactions. There are occasions where the reaction of a juror clearly 
indicates a piece of evidence or a portion of the testimony has profoundly 
affected him or her. However, because the juror's reaction goes unre-
corded in the trial transcript, the reviewing court cannot evaluate the ju-
ror's reactions and therefore cannot accurately determine whether or not 
the Constitutional error was "harmless." 
The themes of the movie critic analogy have also been recognized by 
courts. In discussing the unique features of a criminal defendant testify-
ing in his or her own defense, as compared to the testimony of other wit-
nesses, one court observed, "[w]here the very point of a trial is to deter-
mine whether an individual was involved in criminal activity, the testi-
mony of the individual himself must be considered of prime impor-
tance. "176 The court reached this conclusion because the defendant's testi-
mony provides more than just information; it also allows the jury the op-
portunity to "observe his demeanor and judge his veracity frrsthand. "177 
Such an opportunity is important because, "[t]he facial expressions of a 
witness may convey much more to the trier of facts than do the spoken 
words.'m8 There can be no discounting the possibility that a defendant 
may be able to persuasively tell his story to the jury.179 The court consid-
ered the defendant's being denied the opportunity to present this "eyeball 
testimony" such a "miscarriage of justice" that it mandated automatic 
reversal. 180 There is simply no accurate means for an appellate court to 
accurately measure the effect of a Constitutional error. 
Skeptics of the movie critic analogy would say that the inability to 
accurately measure the effects of a trial error during appellate review is a 
danger inherent to all errors, Constitutional or otherwise. While the criti-
cism is true, and evaluating the effect of any error is problematic, the crit-
ical distinction is the importance of the error being considered. Evaluat-
ing the effect of a coerced confession upon the jury is radically different 
176. United States v. Butts, 630 F. Supp. 1145, 1147 (D. Me. 1986) (quoting United States 
v. Walker, 772 F.2d 1172 (5th Cir. 1985)). 
177. ld. The appellant in the case was claiming that he was denied the effective assistance 
of counsel because, in part, his trial counsel did not call him as a witness to testify in his own 
defense. The reviewing court found this allegation to be true. ld. at 1146, 1147. 
178. ld. at 1148 (quoting United States v. Irvin, 450 F.2d 968, 971 (9th Cir. 1971) 
(Kilkenny, J., dissenting)). 
179. ld. at 1146, 1147. 
180. ld. 
This court considers a defendant's right to testify in a criminal proceeding against him 
so basic to a fair trial that its infraction can never be treated as harmless error, which is 
in essence the inquiry required to be made by the second prong [of the ineffective 
assistance of counsel test]. 
ld. at 1148. However, three other courts considering the question have reached the opposite result. 
See Wright v. Estelle, 549 F.2d 971, 974 (5th Cir. 1977); Ortega v. O'Leary, 843 F.2d 258, 262 
(7th Cir. 1988); Payne v. United States, 78 F.3d 343, 346 (8th Cir. 1996). 
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from determining the effect of a charging indictment reading "against the 
peace and dignity of state" as opposed to "against the peace and dignity 
of the state."181 The former relegates to appellate court judges the impos-
sible task of gleaning the full effect of a Constitutional error from the 
mere words spoken and evidence adduced at trial, while the latter merely 
requires a calculus of the role the written indictment or information 
played in the jury's determination of the defendant's guilt. Admittedly, 
determining the effect of a flawed indictment cannot be done with abso-
lute certainty. But practically speaking, such an error is less likely to have 
influenced the jury. On a theoretical level, the nature of the right violated 
is lower than one of Constitutional proportion. As such, allowing appel-
late courts to review such errors is permissible and in accordance with the 
goals for which the harmless error rule was originally designed. 
Constitutional errors, however, lie well beyond the scope of problems 
which the original harmless error rule attempted to address. 182 In situa-
tions where minor errors, such as misworded indictments, have occurred, 
the reviewing judges can make a reliable determination as to whether 
they are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the error had no effect 
on the outcome of the case. This conclusion follows from the fact that the 
error was truly minor. Even then, we cannot be absolutely certain the er-
ror had no effect on the verdict. Absolute certainty, however, is not the 
governing standard. We need only be convinced beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the error did not taint the verdict. For technical errors, an anal-
ysis can be performed with sufficiently reliable accuracy. 
Conversely, where the error is of Constitutional proportion, the oppo-
site conclusion is required. Unlike truly technical issues and rules, Con-
stitutional rights reflect the complex principles and values upon which 
our society and system of justice are based. 183 As such, their deprivation 
can never be easily evaluated. Appellate courts are simply ill-equipped to 
weigh the effect Constitutional errors have upon the minds of the jurors 
and determine with sufficient certainty (beyond a reasonable doubt) that 
the error played no role in the jury's decision. Therefore, a rule of auto-
matic reversal is mandated for Constitutional errors. 
The notion that reviewing courts cannot and should not attempt to 
weigh Constitutional errors is by no means new. In 1958, the Supreme 
Court admitted that, when a coerced confession is admitted into evidence, 
"no one can say what credit and weight the jury gave to the confes-
sion."184 As has already been discussed in the early cases exempting Con-
181. State v. Campell, 109 S.W. 706, 709 (Mo. 1908) (emphasis added). 
182. This is a topic discussed in greater detail in Part IV. A. 
183. Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 519 (1963). 
184. Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 568 (1958). 
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stitutional errors from the harmless error rule, the Court did not weigh the 
evidentiary value of the Constitutional error at alU85 Rather, even in 
cases such as Haynes where the confession was completely unnecessary 
to the conviction, the defendant was entitled to a new trial conducted 
without the violation of his or her Constitutional rights. 186 As is discussed 
in the next section, to do anything less lowers the inherent value of our 
Constitutional rights. 
C. Subjecting Constitutional Rights to Harmless Error Analysis 
Lowers the Value of Constitutional Rights 
Beyond the legal inconsistences associated with applying the harm-
less error doctrine to violations of a criminal defendant's Constitutional 
rights, fairness and common sense mandate a return to the rule of auto-
matic reversal. The value of a Constitutional right cannot be overstated. 
In the words of Justice Jackson, Constitutional rights are "indispensable 
freedorns."ts7 
Under the current rule, the value of a Constitutional right is signifi-
cantly diminished at best, and in some cases completely worthless. To 
those victimized by Constitutional errors during their trial, the current 
rule sends the message that such a violation may be deemed harmless 
and, therefore, of no significance. In other words, the basic rights upon 
which our country was founded are, at least sometimes, worthless. 
Throughout our nation's history, the Supreme Court has undertaken 
the never-ending task of interpreting what our Constitution means. In do-
ing so, the Court defines what the Constitution means to all of us, includ-
ing criminal defendants. As the Court stated in Marbury v. Madison, 
"[t]he very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every 
individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an 
injury."188 Ironically, it seems that during the late 1960s and early 1970s, 
a period where the Court actively engaged in developing the meaning of 
individual rights, it also held that in some instances those same rights 
were worthless. Each time it did so, the Court diminished the value of the 
Constitutional right itself. 
In order to understand this conclusion, one must first realize the mes-
sage conveyed by applying the harmless error doctrine to a Constitutional 
error. When an appellate court subjects the violation of a defendant's 
Constitutional rights to harmless error analysis, the court is saying that 
185. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 43 n.1 (1967). 
186. !d. at 43 (citing Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 518-19 (1963)). 
187. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 180 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
188. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163, (1803). 
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this defendant's Constitutional right may have been worthless. Even 
worse, if an appellate court then concludes that a Constitutional error was 
in fact harmless, that court is saying that the defendant's Constitutional 
right was worthless. 
In Haynes, an early case refusing to subject the admission of a co-
erced confession to harmless error analysis despite clear independent evi-
dence of guilt, the Court noted that the state had incurred the "substantial 
additional expense" of prosecuting the case through the appellate court 
system. 189 The Court was also aware of the even greater expenditure the 
state would incur during a retrial of the case. 190 Nevertheless, the Court 
reversed the conviction because "it is the deprivation of the protected 
rights themselves which is fundamental and most regrettable, not only 
because of the effect on the individual defendant, but because of the ef-
fect on our system oflaw and justice. "191 
Currently, when appellate courts review Constitutional errors in 
terms of whether they are harmless, the only necessary consideration is 
what effect, if any, the error had on the defendant's trial. This approach 
reduces the Constitutional error to a component in a decision-making pro-
cess based solely on "evidentiary approximation." In other words, a con-
victed defendant's Constitutional rights are unenforceable unless being 
deprived of those rights played an important enough role in his or her 
trial. This misguided belief marks the most serious flaw in the rationale 
underlying the current harmless error rule. In truth, the value of a Consti-
tutional right extends well beyond its evidentiary impact. 
"The search for the truth is indeed central to our system of justice, 
but 'certain Constitutional rights are not, and should not be, subject to 
harmless-error analysis because those rights protect important values that 
are unrelated to the truth-seeking function of the trial. "'192 As has already 
been discussed in pre-Chapman cases, the quality and quantity of evi-
dence introduced independent of the Constitutional violation was not a 
relevant concern. 193 The mere fact that a defendant suffered a Constitu-
tional injury during the adjudication of the case was sufficient to mandate 
reversal because "it is the deprivation of the protected rights themselves 
which is fundamental and the most regrettable .... "194 After the Court 
189. Haynes, 373 U.S. at 519. 
190. !d. 
191. !d. 
192. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 295 (1991) (quoting Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 
587 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgement)). 
193. See, e.g., Haynes, 373 at 520 (1963) (Clark, J., dissenting) (holding the independent 
evidence not only supported the guilt of the defendant, but also corroborated the defendant's 
coerced confession). 
194. !d. at 519. 
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applied the harmless error doctrine to particular Constitutional violations, 
the inherent value of those Constitutional rights was completely obliter-
ated. 
Proponents of applying harmless error analysis to Constitutional er-
rors argue that the importance of judicial economy and practicality out-
weigh the value of having a trial free of Constitutional error. There is no 
question that judicial economy is a valid concern within the criminal jus-
tice system. However, while judicial economy may justify examining de-
fectively scripted indictments and informations, judicial economy does 
not outweigh the inherent value of Constitutional rights. 195 Instead, the 
opposite is true, protecting the rights of a defendant allocated to him or 
her under the Constitution outweighs issues of judicial economy because 
their denial affects not only the individuals case, but our entire system of 
justice. 196 
"[I]t is the deprivation of the protected rights [referring to 
Constitutional rights such as those allocated under the Fifth 
Amendment] themselves which is fundamental and the most 
regrettable, not only because of the effect on the individual 
defendant, but because of the effect on our system of law and 
justice. "197 
While a defendant may not be entitled to a perfect trial, guilt or inno-
cence must be decided by a jury in a trial free from Constitutional infrr-
mity.198 Simply stated, while judicial economy is a compelling concern, it 
does not outweigh the necessity of conducting criminal trials free of Con-
stitutional error. "[l)t is the very purpose of a Bill of Rights to identify 
values that may not be sacrificed to expediency."199 
Allowing the harmless error doctrine either to apply, or not apply, 
means that the value of the Constitutional right is either recognized or 
ignored. The issue must be resolved either affirmatively or negatively: 
there is no middle ground. Concluding that a person's Constitutional 
rights have been violated but denying the same person a remedy is con-
trary to even the most basic notions of fairness. In order to restore fair-
ness to our process system of justice, a return to a rule of automatic rever-
sal is required. 
195. !d. 
196. !d. 
197. !d. 
198. !d. at 518-19. 
199. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 980 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting in part, 
concurring in part). 
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V. THE MERITS OF A RULE OF AUTOMATIC REVERSAL 
Accurately evaluating the merits of returning to a rule of automatic 
reversal requires analyzing the issue from the perspective of those who 
would be most effected. A rule of automatic reversal for Constitutional 
errors would directly affect courts, prosecutors, defendants and the pub-
lic. As will be seen, while a rule of automatic reversal is not without neg-
ative consequences, the merits so greatly outweigh the detriments that 
returning to a rule of automatic reversal is warranted. The following dis-
cussion is not intended to repeat the discussions of the earlier sections. 
Instead, this section suggests the likely effects of applying a rule of auto-
matic reversal in light of the Constitutional principles previously dis-
cussed. 
A. The Effect on Courts 
Evaluating the effect returning to a rule of automatic reversal would 
have upon the courts requires an understanding of the burdens trial and 
appellate courts carry in the criminal justice system. Both trial and appel-
late courts often operate under strict budget constraints. They both main-
tain calenders that require enormous amounts of time and effort to man-
age. Admittedly, a rule of automatic reversal may have a negative impact 
on those interests. Though the court's interest in expediency is worthy of 
consideration, returning to the automatic reversal rule is warranted be-
cause of the greater interest in protecting individual rights. Additionally, 
returning to such a rule would provide positive incentives to both trial 
and appellate courts. And just as the violations of individual liberty tar-
nish not only individual but our entire system of justice, the benefits of 
those positive incentives would extend beyond the bounds of individual 
cases. 
From the trial courts' perspective, the primary concerns related to a 
rule of automatic reversal are time and money. Cases remanded for retrial 
add to what are often already cluttered court calendars. In addition to the 
time demands required by retrials, the trial court would also incur all of 
the associated additional expenses. If, as would be likely, a rule of auto-
matic reversal caused an increase in the number of cases reversed on ap-
peal, the calendars of trial courts would become even more difficult to 
manage. 
Given these concerns, it appears on the surface that a rule of auto-
matic reversal would be contrary to the interests of trial courts. However, 
such a conclusion cannot be reached if the inherent value of Constitu-
tional rights is fully taken into account. It is beyond dispute that the 
court's interest in expediency warrants carefully considering every possi-
ble means of saving the courts' time and the taxpayers' money. But that 
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consideration does not mean that individual rights should be subservient 
to expediency. Investing in preserving the integrity of the constitution and 
the criminal justice system is certainly money well spent. 
As noted by Justice Brennan over a decade ago: "When the public, as 
it quite properly has done in the past as well as in the present, demands 
that those in government increase their efforts to combat crime, it is all 
too easy for [those] government officials to seek expedient solutions."200 
It is admittedly more expedient to apply the harmless error rule to the vio-
lation of a criminal defendant's rights than to automatically require are-
trial. But the Constitution requires more. 
[W]hat the framers understood [in drafting the Bill of Rights] 
remains true today- that the task of combating crime and 
convicting the guilty will in every era seem of such critical and 
pressing concern that we may be lured by the temptations of 
expediency into forsaking our commitment to [individual 
rights]. 201 
Although consideration of the court's interest in expediency is legiti-
mate, that interest is outweighed by the value of the Constitutional rights 
allocated to individuals. 202 "[l]t is the very purpose of a Bill of Rights to 
identify values that may not be sacrificed to expediency."203 Applying the 
harmless error doctrine to Constitutional errors puts the interest of expe-
diency directly in conflict with protecting individual rights. Because the 
value of individual rights outweighs the value of expediency, automatic 
reversal is required. This particular conflict was specifically addressed by 
the Supreme Court in Haynes v. Washington. 204 According to the Su-
preme Court: 
Here it has put the State to the substantial additional expense 
of prosecuting the case through the appellate courts and, now, 
will require even a greater expenditure in the event of retrial, 
as is likely. But it is the deprivation of the protected rights 
200. /d. at 959 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The expedient solution specifically addressed by 
Justice Brennan in his dissenting opinion was a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. 
However, harmless error is analogous to the good faith exception to the extent that both rules are 
meant to avoid what the courts perceive as a miscarriage of justice due to innocent mistakes during 
the adjudication of a criminal case. 
201. Id. at 929-30. Although this quotation by Justice Brennan comes from his dissent to the 
Court's finding a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule, the underlying idea is equally 
applicable in the context of harmless error. 
202. For a thorough discussion of the inherent value of Constitutional rights see Part IV. C. 
203. Leon, 486 U.S. at 980 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part). 
204. 373 u.s. 503 (1963). 
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themselves which is fundamental and most regrettable, not 
only because of the effect on the individual defendant, but 
because ofthe effect on our system oflaw andjustice. 205 
While on the surface it may appear that the automatic reversal con-
cept holds only negative consequences for trial courts, that is not the 
case. Returning to a rule of automatic reversal also provides trial courts 
with strong incentive to protect the defendant's rights. Although the crim-
inal justice system offers many issues upon which reasonable minds may 
disagree, everyone should agree that there is no justice in violating a 
criminal defendant's Constitutional rights. Indeed, every effort should be 
made to ensure that such rights are not violated. A rule of automatic re-
versal serves to promote this principle. The possibility of incurring the 
additional cost of retrial combined with the prospect of an increasingly 
cluttered court calendar provides trial courts with a strong, positive incen-
tive to prevent violations in the first place. 
It is important to understand that the number of cases remanded to the 
trial court due to Constitutional errors is to some degree within the con-
trol of the trial court judge. So long as the trial judge refuses to tolerate 
the violation of the defendant's Constitutional rights, the trial court's cal-
endar will remain largely unaffected by a rule of automatic reversal. In 
the automatic reversal context, the only cases beyond the control of the 
trial court judge are those in which the reviewing court finds a new type 
of Constitutional violation. In such cases, the trial judge would not have 
the benefit of relying on precedent for recognizing and protecting the de-
fendant's Constitutional rights. In all other cases, the trial judge need 
only protect the established Constitutional rights of the defendant in order 
to avoid conducting retrials brought about from a rule of automatic rever-
sal. 
In sum, although a rule of automatic reversal would not be without 
costs to trial courts, the benefits outweigh those costs. A rule of auto-
matic reversal would place incentives into the criminal trial process to 
uphold the Constitutional rights of the accused. By doing so, the rule 
would promote both greater certainty in verdicts and the integrity of the 
criminal justice process. 
From the perspective of appellate courts, returning to a rule of auto-
matic reversal would narrow their role significantly. Under a rule of auto-
matic reversal, appellate courts would merely be required to determine 
whether a Constitutional error occurred. 206 If the reviewing court found 
205. ld. at 519. 
206. This narrowing of issues will not likely eliminate the valid concerns of appellate courts 
regarding efficiency. Even so, those concerns are outweighed by the value of individual rights for 
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such an error, the case would be automatically reversed and remanded to 
the trial court. Automatic reversal also relieves the appellate court of the 
impossible and time consuming task of fairly evaluating whether the Con-
stitutional error affected the jury's verdict. 207 By not attempting to engage 
in such impossible evaluations, the court would promote the integrity of 
the criminal justice process. 
Returning to a rule of automatic reversal would also remedy an addi-
tional problem presented by appellate courts applying the harmless error 
doctrine to Constitutional errors. Under the current rule, there are some 
cases in which appellate courts use the harmless error doctrine as a means 
to avoid making decisions on difficult issues.208 This practice is typically 
seen in cases where courts choose not to inquire whether an error oc-
curred because they reason that if the alleged error occured it would have 
been harmless. By sidestepping the important issue of whether the error 
occurred under the guise of a doctrine that presupposes the existence of 
an error, the reviewing court frustrates the evolution of the law.209 There 
is nothing to suggest that the harmless error doctrine was originally in-
tended to serve such a purpose. 210 
If the harmless error doctrine did not apply to Constitutional errors, 
appellate courts would be left to deal with the substantive aspects of the 
defendant's appeal. By evaluating these questions, appellate courts pro-
vide trial courts with a more definite determination of what is, and what 
is not, error in a given context. When an appellate court holds that deter-
mining whether an error occurred is unnecessary because any such error 
would have been harmless, lower courts are left with no guidance as to 
how to resolve the issue in the future. Such practices only serve to frus-
trate the efficient adjudication of criminal cases. If the application of the 
harmless error doctrine to Constitutional issues were halted, the appellate 
court would be required to evaluate these substantive issues and thereby 
facilitate the continued definition and evolution of Constitutional law. 
What was true in regards to the trial court's expense concerns is also 
true for appellate courts. While there may be increased costs and longer 
court dockets as a result of a rule of automatic reversal, the benefits of the 
rule make those problems worth enduring. In sum, automatic reversal for 
the same reasons discussed in the trial court context. 
207. See Part IV. B. 
208. See, e.g., Wright v. Estelle, 549 F.2d 971 (5th Cir. 1977) (declining to inquire whether 
defendant has a fundamental right to testify in his own behalf). 
209. Harry T. Edwards, To Err is Human, But Not Always Harmless: When Should Legal 
Error Be Tolerated?, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1167, 1182 (1995). 
210. Donald A. Winslow, Note, Harmful Use of Harmless Error in Criminal Cases, 64 
CORNElL L. REV. 538, 542 (1979). 
104 B. Y. U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume 12 
Constitutional errors is the only means of assuring individuals that, while 
they may not be entitled to an error-free trial, they will receive a fair one. 
B. The Effect on Prosecutors 
While there are strong reasons to return to the automatic reversal rule 
from the perspectives of other groups, there are fewer benefits from the 
prosecutor's perspective. Like the courts, prosecutors would probably 
bear increased costs and caseloads under the automatic reversal rule. But 
more problematically, prosecutors would once again be confronted with 
the difficult task of proving the defendant's guilt in a second trial. 
Generally speaking, obtaining a conviction on retrial is more difficult 
than in the first trial. Subsequent trials occur several months or even 
years after the first. Witnesses are difficult to relocate and securing their 
willing participation may be problematic. Even where the witnesses are 
available and willing to testify for a second time, their memories are 
likely to have dulled between the first and second trials, making their tes-
timony less credible and more vulnerable to attack. Even more worrisome 
for the prosecution in subsequent trials is the fact that the prosecution 
usually presents its strongest theory during the initial trial. Having al-
ready heard the government's theory, the defense is better able to prepare 
for subsequent trials. All of these considerations make subsequent trials 
due to automatic reversal undesirable for prosecutors. 
But to some extent, these concerns provide the prosecution with an 
incentive to avoid violating the defendant's rights. The likelihood of hav-
ing a weaker case on retrial should motivate the prosecution to obtain a 
conviction free of Constitutional error in the first trial. While this incen-
tive may seem illogical on the surface, it is actually consistent with the 
true role the prosecutor plays in criminal cases. 
"[T]he prosecutor's role transcends that of an adversary."211 The 
prosecutor "is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, 
but of a sovereignty . . . whose interest . . . in a criminal prosecution is 
not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done."212 As has al-
ready been discussed, if a trial is not conducted free from Constitutional 
error, it is not fair and can therefore not be considered just. 213 In short, no 
one has a legitimately defensible interest in violating an individuals con-
stitutional right. A prosecutors role in the process is to not merely pursue 
a conviction, but instead to pursue the truth. Therefore, a prosecutor who 
211. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 675 n.6 (1985). 
212. !d. (quoting Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935); See also Brady v. 
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87-88 (1963)). 
213. See Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 519 (1963). 
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understands his or her true role in the criminal justice process cannot 
claim unfair injury from a rule of automatic reversal. 
C. The Effect on Criminal Defendants 
Returning to a rule of automatic reversal assures defendants that their 
Constitutional rights will be protected and respected. The rule of auto-
matic reversal also ensures that while each criminal defendant may not 
receive a perfect trial, his or her trial will be free of Constitutional infrr-
mity. By doing so, the rule increases the reliability of verdicts. 
Under the current rule, a criminal defendant convicted in a trial 
where his or her Constitutional rights are violated receives the message 
that his or her Constitutional rights may not be equal to the Constitutional 
rights of other citizens. As a practical matter, violating a defendant's 
Constitutional rights during trial gains legal significance only if the re-
viewing court decides the error was not harmless. However, as was dis-
cussed in Part IV. B above, this is an analysis reviewing courts are ill-
equipped to conduct. Apart from the evidentiary impact of the violated 
right, the inherent value of the right is ignored when automatic reversal is 
denied. 
Under a rule of automatic reversal, the criminal defendant is assured 
that his or her Constitutional rights have just as much importance and are 
protected to the same degree as the rights of any other citizen. A rule of 
automatic reversal assures defendants that a confession given to the po-
lice as a result of outrageous coercive treatment will never be admitted 
into a criminal trial. 214 Automatic reversal protects defendants from the 
possibility of unfair convictions based upon unreasonable searches or 
seizures.215 The denial of counsel at critical stages of the case would like-
wise never play a part in a defendant's conviction. 216 Defendants would 
no longer run the risk that prosecutors could improperly comment upon 
their refusal to waive the right to remain silent. 217 Defendants would also 
be assured that they would not be convicted in a trial in which the jury is 
not instructed that they are to be presumed innocent. 218 In sum, a rule of 
automatic reversal protects both the actual and inherent value of our most 
214. Under Fulminante, such a result is currently possible. For a description of the 
outrageous coercive tactics used against one defendant, see supra, note 138. 
215. See generally, Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 52-53 (1970). 
216. See Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1970). 
217. See United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499 (1983). 
218. See Kentucky v. Whorton, 441 U.S. 786 (1979). 
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cherished liberties.219 It provides a prophylactic effect in criminal trials by 
removing any incentive to violate an individual's Constitutional rights. 
From the perspective of criminal defendants, the merits of the auto-
matic reversal rule infinitely outweigh the costs. Such a rule is the only 
means of fairly adjudicating the charges against them. Equally important, 
it insures that the inherent values of their Constitutional rights are pre-
served. While some may speculate that the rule allocates too much free-
dom to criminal defendants, in truth it gives them nothing more than the 
assurance that their cases will be fairly resolved. 
D. The Effect on the Public 
The effect on the public of returning to a rule of automatic reversal is 
the culmination of the considerations discussed thus far. In terms of detri-
ments, any extra costs associated with automatic reversal are ultimately 
paid by the taxpayers. This includes any additional expense incurred by 
the courts or prosecutors. If the defendant is represented by appointed 
counsel, those additional expenses must also be paid by the public. Simi-
larly, the public would be forced to endure any delays brought about by 
increasingly cluttered court calendars. One need only watch the evening 
news to discover the public's discontent with how long it takes to resolve 
criminal cases under the current system. Any further delays are sure to be 
met with increased public disapproval. Even more importantly, the public 
deserves to have the criminal code enforced. 
It is important to note at the outset that these detriments can actually 
serve a positive function. They give society an interest in protecting the 
rights of the accused. Nearly all of the additional expenses and delays are 
avoidable. If a criminal defendant's Constitutional rights are not infringed 
upon, the new rule, which in reality is nothing more than returning to the 
old rule, changes nothing. It is only when Constitutional rights are vio-
lated that the above detriments are incurred. As has already been dis-
cussed, no one has a legitimate interest in violating an individual's Con-
stitutional rights. That principle extends not only to the courts and prose-
cutors, but to the general public as well. Thus, returning to a rule of auto-
matic reversal provides the public with an incentive to safeguard the Con-
stitution. 
A rule of automatic reversal also benefits the public because it in-
creases the reliability of verdicts. For example, assuming all other vari-
ables remain constant, the conviction of a criminal defendant upheld on 
219. See Part II above for a listing of many of the Constitutional violations which have been 
subjected to harmless error analysis. Part IV. C discusses the inherent value of Constitutional 
rights. 
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appeal free of Constitutional infirmity is much more reliable than the 
same conviction upheld by virtue of an appellate courts finding that the 
deprivation of a Constitutional right harmless. Not only are unreliable 
verdicts incapable of furthering any just purpose, they serve to undermine 
the entire jury system. By allowing criminal defendants to be convicted 
only in a trial free of Constitutional violations, we further the public's 
interest in obtaining reliable verdicts. 
It cannot be denied that a rule of automatic reversal frustrates soci-
ety's interest in having the criminal code enforced in cases where the de-
fendant is ultimately found guilty in a criminal trial of the charged of-
fense. This frustration, however, does not require abandoning the auto-
matic reversal rule. It must be remembered that when a Constitutional 
error occurs, it is the defendant who is victimized, and that the court, not 
the defendant, is responsible for that injury. Obviously, the defendant has 
no interest in having his or her Constitutional rights violated. Any discon-
tent with the injury should not be directed towards the victimized defen-
dant, but towards the entity allowing it to occur, namely the court. In-
deed, the remedy for society's frustration is to insist that the courts refuse 
to allow any Constitutional injury to occur, rather than to deny a remedy 
to the victim of such injury. Like the courts, lawyers, and defendants, so-
ciety receives no benefit from a trampling of the Constitution. 
There are also important policy benefits for upholding the Constitu-
tional rights of individuals. Many people in society are faced, from time 
to time, with the temptation to violate the law. The motivations for violat-
ing criminal laws are numerous and well beyond the scope of this thesis. 
Regardless of why a person considers breaking the law, the decision to 
break the law becomes easier to justify when prosecutors, police, and 
judges, are allowed to benefit from its violation. Subjecting Constitu-
tional errors to harmless error analysis allows those charged with enforc-
ing the law to benefit from violating it. By preventing the government 
from benefiting from Constitutional errors, we promote the value of Con-
stitutional rights and send the message that no one in the legal system 
benefits from breaking the law. 
Finally, it is in the public's best interest to return to a rule of auto-
matic reversal because it is the only rule that truly protects the inherent 
value of an individual's Constitutional rights. After all, the public is made 
up of nothing more than the mass grouping of individuals. If the value of 
Constitutional rights diminishes for a particular criminal defendant, that 
value diminishes for everyone. "Justice is always the same, whether it be 
due from one man to a million, or from a million to one man. "220 
220. Attributed to John Jay. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
There is no such thing as a harmless Constitutional error. In 1919, 
Congress realized that criminal trials need not be perfect in order for ju-
ries to arrive at reliable verdicts. Congress and the courts realized that 
technical errors such as misworded indictments could occur without un-
dermining the defendant's right to a fair trial. From those humble begin-
nings, the application of the harmless error doctrine has expanded to the 
point that we now may consider whether the admission of a confession 
obtained by government force or coercion is harmless; a destination 
better left unreached. 
In the Chapman decision, the Court navigated the harmless error doc-
trine into the provinces of Constitutional rights. In order to do so, the 
Court violated the fundamental concept of stare decisis. The majority of 
the Court claimed the issue was one of first impression despite Justice 
Stewart's concurrence indicating that not only had the issue been previ-
ously considered but the opposite conclusion reached. 
After the harmless error doctrine crossed the Constitutional rights 
boundary, the rule was applied somewhat arbitrarily and in some in-
stances, without explanation. In the Fulminante decision, the Supreme 
Court attempted to map the limits of the harmless error rule within the 
Constitutional landscape by distinguishing between "trial" and "struc-
tural" errors. In attempting to draw the line, the Court ignored prior pre-
cedent in direct conflict with the newly articulated distinction. In some 
ways, Fulminante represents a flawed map: it does not accurately reflect 
the terrain. Nevertheless, it serves as the current guide for determining 
whether a given Constitutional violation will be subjected to harmless 
error analysis. 
Today, the question is whether the harmless error doctrine should 
remain applicable to violations of Constitutional rights or retreat to the 
land of technical errors from which it came. This thesis demonstrates 
that, although there is some justification for the rule to remain, the wiser 
course favors retreat. Expediency is not to be discounted, but the practical 
and inherent values of individual freedoms outweigh expediency in the 
harmless error context. 
In truth, an accurate map distinguishing Constitutional rights cannot 
be drawn because the value of all Constitutional rights are indistinguish-
able from one another. As a matter of practicality, appellate courts are 
incapable of effectively evaluating the effect a Constitutional error on a 
particular jury. Even if courts could make such an evaluation, they should 
refrain from doing so because allowing a criminal conviction to stand in 
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spite of a Constitutional right being violated intolerably diminishes the 
value of our individual freedoms. 
In the final analysis, whether we should return to a rule of automatic 
reversal depends upon the value placed upon Constitutional rights. In-
deed, our current toleration of the harmless error rule in the Constitu-
tional context reflects poorly on the value now placed on individual 
rights. As this thesis demonstrates, the current rule undermines the inher-
ent value of Constitutional rights. As a practical matter, it prohibits 
courts, prosecutors, defendants and the public from obtaining verdicts 
worthy of reliance. Although criminal trials need not be perfect, they 
must be conducted free of Constitutional infirmity. "That which is unjust 
can really profit no one; that which is just can really harm no one. "221 The 
time has come to return to a rule of automatic reversal. 
221. AMERICAN QUOTATIONS 306 (Gorton Carruth & Eugene Ehrlich eds., Wings Books 
1992) (quoting Henry George, THE IRISH LAND QUESTION (1884)). 
